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WHY DID BELGIUM PAY LEOPOLD’S
BONDS?
KIM OOSTERLINCK, JOSEPH BLOCHER & MITU GULATI*
I
INTRODUCTION
King Leopold II’s horrific abuse of the Congo Free State (CFS) was a
humanitarian disaster of incalculable proportions,1 and inspired what has been
called the first great international human rights campaign of the twentieth
century.2 This campaign—which united humanitarian and commercial
interests3—eventually forced Leopold to sell the CFS to Belgium, transforming
Congo from a private colony to a public one.4
Scholars have long noted the ways in which international law—including basic
conceptions of sovereignty—shaped and were shaped by the rise and fall of the
CFS. How, for example, should law account for the kind of private empire that
Leopold ruled?5 Both he and Belgium were careful to separate Leopold’s roles
as monarch of Belgium and as the owner and king of CFS.6 Indeed, Leopold
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1. See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR
AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998), for a discussion of King Leopold’s despotism in Africa.
2. E.g., id. at 2; JASON STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF
THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 7 (2011).
3. See, e.g., MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD II, THE
CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 217–18 (2002) (describing how reports on both the
humanitarian crisis and severe trade restrictions helped change Belgian public sentiment regarding the
CFS); THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: THE WHITE MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE
DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912, at 586 (1990) (“What was new was that these humanitarians had
now joined hands with the men of commerce, God with Mammon.”).
4. See generally Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Transferable Sovereignty: Lessons from the History
of the Congo Free State, 69 DUKE L.J. 1219 (2020), for a more complete account of the forced sale, and
an argument that the forced sale has important lessons for international law.
5. See generally STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN EUROPE’S
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, 165–218 (2017) (describing Leopold’s eventually successful effort to convince
the global powers to recognize his corporation’s private ownership of the Congo).
6. The relationship between property and sovereignty in the context of the CFS raises many
complicated questions, which this Article cannot fully address. It is worth noting, though, that Leopold
explicitly demanded that the treaties his representatives signed with native Congolese included articles
that “delegate to us their sovereign rights over the territories which are the subject of the said conventions . . .
. . The treaties must be as brief as possible and in a couple of articles must grant us everything.” EWANS,
supra note 3, at 71 (emphasis added).
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pursued the colony in his private capacity precisely because Belgium did not want
a colony of its own,7 and he governed it like private property, refusing to reveal
even the most basic information about his rule.8 How complicit was the
international law community in effectively recognizing a private sovereignty that
merged the roles of sovereign and proprietor?9
That legal recognition, in turn, helped to construct—or at least enable—
certain kinds of markets. Much has been written about “red rubber,” and the
ways in which Leopold’s voracious pursuit of wealth ruined millions of Congolese
lives.10 How many lives were lost, and who actually reaped the benefits, remain
topics of scholarly and public debate.11 But markets also enabled the horrors in
the CFS in a more direct but less recognized way: they provided the funds—via
the sovereign debt markets—to establish and run the country in the first place.
Especially in the early years, Leopold relied heavily on bond markets to finance
his sovereign enterprise; when Belgium acquired the colony in 1908, it also
acquired—or at least paid—the CFS bonds.12 The question that interests us has
to do with the willingness of the markets to fund Leopold’s genocidal enterprise.
Under the doctrine of odious debts,13 one might expect the CFS debts to be a
prime candidate for repudiation: the debts were clearly undertaken without the
consent, and indeed to the detriment, of the Congolese people, and were used to
enrich Leopold himself. And yet there seems to have been no realistic

7. See PRESS, supra note 5, at 84 (noting King Leopold’s wish to expand Belgium’s control, and the
domestic opposition he faced).
8. As King Leopold II said before handing over the colony in November 1908, “I will give them my
Congo, but they have no right to know what I have done there!” ROGER ANSTEY, KING LEOPOLD’S
LEGACY: THE CONGO UNDER BELGIAN RULE 1908-1960, at 272 (1996). See also HOCHSCHILD, supra
note 1, at 258 (stating that, in King Leopold’s words, the CFS was “not beholden to anyone except to its
founder . . . . No one ha[d] the right to ask for its accounts”).
9. See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 155–56 (2002) (“Perhaps the most striking effort to create
European sovereignty—and the greatest disappointment about the civilizing mission—can be gleaned in
the story of the ‘Independent State of the Congo,’ created in 1884-85 in part by the private activity of
King Léopold II of the Belgians and in part by the concerted action of European powers.”); CARL
SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM
214–26 (G.L. Ulmen trans., Telos Press 2003) (1950) (using the CFS to illustrate the disintegration of a
spatial legal order).
10. See generally EDMUND D. MOREL, RED RUBBER: THE STORY OF THE RUBBER SLAVE TRADE
FLOURISHING ON THE CONGO IN THE YEAR OF GRACE 1906 (1907) (providing a contemporary report
of King Leopold’s wealth-driven atrocities in the Congo, and its effect on the millions in the region).
11. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 225–26 (noting the difficulty of the “historical detective
work” necessary to estimate a true figure of lives lost during the CFS).
12. Robert Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL
INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS 343, 357 (William N. Goetzman & K.
Geet Rouwenhorst eds., 2005).
13. See JEFF KING, THE DOCTRINE OF ODIOUS DEBTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
RESTATEMENT 125 (2016) (summarizing governments’ ability to repudiate subjugation debts—those
whose purpose is actively hostile to the major interests of the population of the debtor state).
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consideration of this possibility, as we discuss in more detail in a separate paper
investigating the contemporary scholarly, political, and legal debates.14
But what about the markets themselves? An age-old question at the
intersection of law, markets, and ethics is whether markets, even in the absence
of legal sanctions, constrain certain types of bad behavior.15 In the equity context,
there is a large body of empirical research asking whether so-called sin securities
(for example, stocks in tobacco, gambling, and alcohol companies) suffer a
market penalty. Some scholars find that they do.16 The reason for the penalty,
scholars conjecture, is at least in part that enough investors care about the ethics
of their investments to impose a price penalty on the companies in question.17
That question is particularly salient in the case of sovereigns, given that there are
few formal legal constraints on sovereigns doing bad things to their own people.18
Our goal in this Article is to use King Leopold’s reign—as sinful as they come,
and eventually recognized as such—to measure the market penalty for sin in the
sovereign borrowing markets. In particular, we focus on the prices and yields to
maturity (YTMs)19 on the loans issued by King Leopold on behalf of the CFS
between 1885 and 1908. Data on that borrowing implicates two related questions
about despotic sovereign borrowing. The first question is whether, once the
despotism is revealed to the public, the markets begin to penalize the borrower.
The second is whether the successor government to the despot receives a market
reward for paying those creditors who funded the despot.
The answers to these questions, in turn, may have much to tell us about law—
and, in particular, the doctrine of odious debts. On the one hand, a market
penalty for sinful bonds might be taken as evidence of the doctrine’s existence:
perhaps it signals concern that the debts will be repudiated by a successor. On
14. Joseph Blocher, Kim Oosterlinck & Mitu Gulati, King Leopold’s Bonds and the Mystery of
Odious Debts, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020).
15. See, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015); Robert C. Hughes,
Would Many People Obey Non-Coercive Law?, 9 JURIS. 361 (2018), for discussions on whether society
may constrain conduct without legal sanctions.
16. E.g., Stefano Collonello, Giuliano Curatola & Alessandro Gioffre, Pricing Sin Stocks: Ethical
Preferences vs. Risk Aversion, 118 EUR. ECON. REV. 69 (2019); William Ming Yang Cheng & Desmond
Lam, Comparing the Price of Sin: Abnormal Returns of Cross-Listed Gaming Stocks in the Hong Kong
and US Markets, 45 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 73 (2015); Robert B. Durand, SzeeKee Koh & Paul L.
Tan, The Price of Sin in the Pacific Basin 21 PAC. BASIN FIN. J. 899 (2013); Frank J. Fabozzi, K.C. Ma &
Becky J. Oliphant, Sin Stock Returns, 35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 82 (2008); Julie M. Salaber, The
Determinants of Sin Stock Returns: Evidence on the European Markets, (2007 draft), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1071746 [https://perma.cc/N783-SSS2].
17. E.g., Harrison G. Hong & Marcin Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effect of Social Norms on
Markets, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 15 (2009); Harrison G. Hong & Leonard Kostovetsky, Red and Blue Investing:
Value and Finance, 103 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012).
18. Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of
Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651 (explaining that the primary constraints on
opportunistic defaults by sovereign debtors have long been non legal).
19. YTM represents the total return a bond will provide on its purchase price if held to maturity,
expressed as an annual rate. This calculation provides a standard measure to gauge the returns of fixedincome securities with differing expiries. See ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS,
INVESTMENTS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 479 (9th ed. 2011).

FINAL - OOSTERLINCK (DO NOT DELETE)

52

6/26/2020 3:56 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 83:49

the other hand, if successor governments receive market rewards for paying
despots’ debts, that may help explain why the doctrine is so hard to observe in
practice—after all, the legal rights it creates are in the nature of an option, the
exercise of which might not have sufficient value. Perhaps Belgium could have
legally repudiated the debts, but had political or even moral reasons not to. This
exemplifies a tough evidentiary problem for advocates of the odious debt
doctrine, since the standard definition of customary international law requires
evidence of nations following a rule out of a sense of legal obligation.20 If nations
have no financial incentive to repudiate, the market will effectively hide any
evidence of the legal rule.21
To examine whether markets penalized King Leopold II’s despotism or
rewarded Belgium for honoring the CFS bonds, this Article proceeds in five
parts. Part II explains how sovereign debt markets may respond to despotism or
incentivize payment of sinful debts using two contemporary examples. Part III
describes prior research on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century debts
of colonies (of which the CFS bonds are a part) and describes the Article’s
dataset. Part IV analyzes the data and finds that sovereign debt markets neither
penalized the CFS bonds once King Leopold’s despotism was uncovered, nor
rewarded Belgium for continuing to honor the bonds after purchasing the CFS.
Part V concludes.
II
MARKET RESPONSES TO DESPOTIC SOVEREIGNS
To explicate the relevance of this inquiry, we begin with two contemporary
and familiar examples: Venezuela in 2017 and South Africa in 1994, which neatly
map onto the two questions we raised earlier. The first involves the markets’
treatment of despotic borrowers; the second involves the incentives of sovereigns
to pay sinful debts.
A. Sovereign Sin Penalties: Venezuela 2017
On May 26, 2017, Harvard economist and former Venezuelan Finance
Minister Ricardo Hausmann penned an op-ed titled “Venezuela’s Hunger
Bonds.”22 The article urged investors to consider the humanitarian crisis in
Venezuela; one that was being exacerbated by the Venezuelan government’s
decision to pay coupons on its foreign debt obligations instead of purchasing
20. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J.
202, 209 (2010) (“The standard definition of CIL [customary international law] is that it arises from the
practices of nations followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Under this account, there are two elements
to CIL: an objective state-practice element and a subjective sense-of-legal-obligation (or opinio juris)
element.”) (internal citations omitted).
21. We are grateful to the symposium participants for an engaging discussion on this point.
22. Ricardo Hausmann, Venezuela’s Hunger Bonds, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 26, 2017),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/maduro-venezuela-hunger-bonds-by-ricardo-hausmann2017-05 [https://perma.cc/BU7T-T532].
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vitally necessary medicine and food for its people. The support that foreign bond
investors were providing the Maduro government in Venezuela, Hausmann
argued, had become a proximate cause of the crisis in that country. Hausmann
appealed to the moral sentiments of investors, asking that they move their
investments to less harmful settings.23
Roughly around the same time, news came out that Goldman Sachs had
purchased $2.8 billion in bonds of the Venezuelan state-owned oil company,
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), on May 23rd, just a few days prior to the
publication of Hausmann’s op-ed.24 The purchase had been made at thirty-one
cents on the dollar for a total price of $865 million, an exceptionally deep discount
from the face value of the bonds.25 This was, in a sense, precisely the type of
investment that Hausmann had pleaded with Wall Street not to make. Media
reacted with outrage at the news of Goldman Sachs’s behavior and started
referring to the PDVSA bond as the “Hunger Bond.”26
The bond became a pariah. None of the big investors would touch it, which
meant that the small investors did not want it either. The bond YTM rose almost
500 basis points within the first five days from when the media storm broke and
Goldman Sachs lost almost $50 million in the market value of its new asset (in
addition to not being able to unload it).27 Two years later, in late 2019, the Hunger
Bond still trades at a significant discount to other similar Venezuelan bonds.28
The story of the Hunger Bond raises the question of whether the bond
markets have reacted similarly in other situations, penalizing obviously sinful
borrowing by sovereigns. That question is so important because there are
relatively few formal legal constraints on unethical or sinful sovereign borrowing.
Scholars and activists have been arguing for years that a doctrine of odious debts
should be recognized by the international community,29 but those efforts have
generally failed. To the extent social disapproval can work to substitute for the

23. Id.
24. Jana Kasperkevic, What You Need to Know about Venezuela’s ‘Hunger Bonds’, MARKETPLACE
(May 31, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/05/31/what-you-need-know-about-venezuela-shunger-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/F5U2-3TSQ].
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Kejal Vyas et al., Goldman Sachs Under Fire for Venezuela Bond Deal, WALL ST. J.
(May 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-sachs-under-fire-for-venezuela-bond-deal-1496
100583 [https://perma.cc/EVC5-52SQ]; Opinion, Banks Are Right to Shun Venezuela’s Hunger Bonds,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0490f1e8-7e83-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c
[https://perma.cc/Z5F6-PS8F].
27. See generally Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, The Hausmann-Gorky Effect, J. BUS. ETHICS
(forthcoming 2019), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-019-04132-9 [https://perma.cc/
9M3L-LRMP], for a detailed discussion of the market response to the Hunger Bond revelations.
28. Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Puzzling Pricing of Venezuelan Bonds, CREDITSLIPS
(Oct. 5, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/10/the-puzzling-pricing-ofvenezuelan-sovereign-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/Q4CA-FMPN].
29. See generally Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debts, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82
(2006); Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, Odiousness Ratings for Public Debt, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/odiousness-ratings-public-debt-byricardo-hausmann-and-ugo-panizza-2017-08?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/HB9A-8Z2G].
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absence of a legal regime, perhaps this can be a useful tool for activists seeking
to limit market support for regimes such as the current one in Caracas. Knowing
the history of when and why social approval has either worked or not to impose
a market penalty on bad sovereigns is important for anyone seeking to utilize this
strategy.
With respect to sovereign bonds, some studies have found that markets
impose a YTM penalty on bonds that were either issued by despotic governments
or whose proceeds were used for ill purposes.30 Most directly comparable to the
Hunger Bond is the story told by economic historians Collet and Oosterlinck.
They find that, in 1906, when the Russian Tsar issued a bond for which he had
failed to obtain appropriate legislative approvals, the Tsar’s actions were severely
criticized in the European press and the market imposed a significant penalty on
the bond issuances.31 In a different article, Collet investigates the treatment of
certain Spanish bonds backed by Cuban resources, whose proceeds had been
used to put down the Cuban independence movement.32 She finds that, in the
wake of the Spanish-American War, the markets imposed a steep discount on
these particular bonds as compared to the other Spanish bonds whose proceeds
were presumably used for more mundane purposes.33 In another article,
Oosterlinck finds that the bonds issued by the Nazi-supported government of
Vichy France traded at a discount to bonds issued by France’s prior legitimate
government.34
These findings return us to the story at the heart of this Article: that of the
CFS. At the start of his venture in the CFS in the 1880s, Leopold claimed that his
motives were benevolent and that he wanted to eradicate Arab slavery and bring
civilization and free trade to the natives.35 Some might even have believed him.
But by 1904 at the very latest,36 Leopold had been revealed to be the overlord of
a regime that put profit above any humanitarian concerns (or constraints, for that
matter).37 Relevant for our purposes is the fact that Leopold issued debt all
30. More tangentially, there are a handful of papers investigating whether investors reward socially
responsible sovereigns with lower YTM. E.g., Gunther Capelle-Blachard et al., Sovereign Bond Yield
Spreads and Sustainability: An Empirical Analysis of OECD Countries, 98 J. BANKING & FIN. 156 (2019);
Bastien Drut, Sovereign Bonds and Socially Responsible Investment, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 131 (2010).
31. Stephanie Collet & Kim Oosterlinck, Denouncing Odious Debts, 160 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 217–
18 (2019).
32. See generally Stephanie Collet, The Financial Penalty for “Unfair” Debt: The Case of Cuban
Bonds at the Time of Independence, 17 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 364 (2013).
33. Id. at 385.
34. Kim Oosterlinck, The Bond Market and the Legitimacy of Vichy France, 40 EXPLORATIONS
ECON. HIST. 326, 342–43 (2003).
35. See generally EWANS, supra note 3, at 84–108 (describing Leopold’s eventually successful
campaign to gain international recognition for his sovereign control of the Congo with the stated goals
of ending the slave trade and bringing civilization and free trade to the region).
36. See generally Blocher, Oosterlinck & Gulati, supra note 14 (exploring the timeline of the public
understanding of Leopold’s motivations in the CFS).
37. See EWANS, supra note 3, at 193 (quoting reformer and diplomat Roger Casement to the effect
that “[t]he root of the evil lies in the fact that the government of the Congo is above all a commercial
trust, that everything is orientated towards commercial gain”); see also PAKENHAM, supra note 3, at 661
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through this period. This means that there are bonds that he issued in his early
years (when the markets might have thought they were supporting a
humanitarian venture) and those from the later years (when the venture had been
revealed to be genocidal). Comparing the prices and YTMs on those bonds can
give us a sense of whether the markets penalized the sinful bonds, as they did
with the Hunger Bond in Venezuela and with the other despotic regimes
analyzed.
B. Successor Rewards: South Africa 1994
In 1994, after years of internal struggle and widespread international
condemnation, the apartheid government of South Africa was finally on its way
out. The apartheid government had racked up nearly $20 billion in debt while
under United Nations sanctions.38 The existence of these sanctions did not
automatically erase the obligation of the new, Nelson Mandela-led African
National Congress government to pay the debts. But enforcing debt claims
against a recalcitrant sovereign is not easy, and as a practical matter collecting
payment on the debts would have been difficult, if not impossible.
And yet South Africa’s new government paid in full the debts of its apartheid
predecessor.39 One likely explanation is that South Africa feared that repudiating
the apartheid-era sovereign debt would hurt its future borrowing prospects.40 The
question that interests us is whether, as a financial matter, South Africa made the
right decision.41 Do markets indeed reward the payment of sinful debts?
The case of King Leopold’s debts provides traction on this question because
Belgium, which could have stiffed Leopold’s creditors when it took over the CFS,
did not.42 Like South Africa in 1994, Belgium paid the sinful debts. And because
Belgium had its own bonds trading at the time when the decision to pay the King
Leopold’s sinful bonds was made, we can examine how investors in Belgian
bonds reacted.
The economic theory of sovereign lending and borrowing often distinguishes
between defaults that the market is willing to excuse (for example, defaults
caused by factors out of the sovereign’s control, such as an unexpected weather
event) and those that it sees as a sign of irresponsibility (for example, a default

(citing the United States Consul-General’s report that the CFS was not really a state but “one
tremendous commercial organization”).
38. See, e.g., Jeff Rubin, Challenging Apartheid’s Foreign Debt, PROBE INT’L (Apr. 1997), http://
probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/RUBIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF68-YK32].
39. Mariam Isa, Apartheid Debt Settled, FIN24 (Sept. 3, 2001), https://www.fin24.com/Economy/
Apartheid-debt-settled-20010903 [https://perma.cc/633B-CGJ6].
40. For discussions of the reputational considerations, see, for example, STEPHANIA BONILLA, LAW
AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES 36 (2010); Unforgiveable, ECONOMIST (Apr. 24, 1999), https://
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/1999/04/22/unforgivable [https://perma.cc/P6RZ-TLHQ].
41. Best we know, there is no research on this question as of yet. It is, however, one of the projects
we are contemplating.
42. Of course, Belgium was differently situated in other ways, including the fact that it—more than
South Africa’s new government—had directly benefited from the prior borrowing. See infra Part V.
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caused by excessive spending).43 Did the market see Belgium’s payment of the
CFS debts as a sign that Belgium was a good debtor who paid those debts it might
have resisted? Or did it see Belgium as an irresponsible debtor squandering
resources on debts which the markets would have excused? Theory alone does
not answer this question, so we use empirics.44
III
BACKGROUND ON COLONIAL BONDS AND OUR DATA
To understand our analysis of the CFS bonds, it helps to situate the analysis
within the context of the broader literature on bonds of colonies. These bonds
have received substantial attention from economists. In particular, research on
British colony bonds suggests that they traded at lower YTMs than what local
economic conditions would have warranted.45 That is, they were perceived as less
risky than they should have been.
Scholars have suggested that the imperial power or mother country provided
an implicit guarantee of the colonial bonds.46 Despite the implicit guarantee,
bonds issued by the imperial power itself usually trade at lower YTMs than bonds
issued under the name of its colonies. However, the difference observed between
these YTMs may reflect differences in other factors such as liquidity (with the
mother country having greater liquidity).47
Colonial status does not, however, unambiguously provide a borrowing
benefit. Some researchers find, for example, that there are periods of history—
such as the period between World Wars I and II—when the benefit disappears.48
For example, once Britain left the gold standard, investors began to reassess
43. See generally Hershel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim:
Excusable Default, Repudiation and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1088 (1988) (identifying this market
distinction).
44. This question has come up recently in the contexts of Mozambique and Malaysia. See Mark
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Mozambique’s Guarantees on the Tuna Bonds: Can They be Repudiated?,
CREDITSLIPS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/01/mozambiques-guaranteeson-the-tuna-bonds-can-they-be-repudiated.html [https://perma.cc/54LN-2244]; Mitu Gulati, Holiday
Reading Recommendation and a Research Question, CREDITSLIPS (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.
creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/11/holiday-reading-recommendation-and-a-research-question-on-the1mdb-case.html [https://perma.cc/4NG7-MD5U].
45. See generally A.K. CAIRNCROSS, HOME AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1870-1913: STUDIES IN
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 222–35 (1953) (discussing how foreign investment in colonies traded at a
premium compared to the risk for default); LANCE E. DAVIS & ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK, MAMMON
AND THE PURSUIT OF EMPIRE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM 1860-1912 (1986).
46. See Olivier Accominotti, Marc Flandreau & Riad Rezzic, The Spread of Empire: Clio and the
Measurement of Colonial Borrowing Costs, 64 ECON. HIST. REV. 385, 400 (2011) (“[P]owers with an
international credit ended up acquiring subject nations and . . . signaled ownership, and this was reflected
in the market.”). The data was kindly put at our disposal by the authors at http://eh.net/database/globalfinance/ [https://perma.cc/T5Y6-ZD8A].
47. Matthieu Chavaz & Marc Flandreau, High & Dry: The Liquidity and Credit of Foreign
Government Debt in the First Age of Globalization (1880-1910), 77 J. ECON. HIST. 653, 686 (2017).
48. Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 18701913 versus 1925-31, 113 ECON. J. 241, 265–66 (2003).
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Britain’s willingness (and ability) to guarantee bonds issued by its colonies.
Independence movements, such as that in India, also led investors to question
whether the guarantee would hold if the movements were successful.49
The case of the CFS differs from the typical colonial bonds in multiple ways.
First, the CFS was not, strictly speaking, a colony of an imperial power. It was
effectively the private property of the monarch of Belgium—King Leopold II—
and, in that sense, an independent state. One, therefore, might not expect its
bonds to receive the benefit of an implicit Belgian guarantee—at least not until
it transitioned to a Belgian colony in 1908.50
Second, the CFS went from being an independent state with bonds on the
international market to being a colony. That kind of transition is rare, as a
historical matter, since most transitions occur in the opposite order. It is even
more uncommon to have data on bonds issued by the country before and after
its change of status, which allows us here to examine how the transition affected
bond YTM.
Over its existence between 1885 and 1908, the CFS issued several loans. Table
1 lists the details of these.
Table 1. List of Loans Issued by the CFS51
Loan

Decree

2.5%
1887 Loan
1888 Lottery
Loan

July 5,
1887
February 7,
1888
October
17, 1896
June 14,
1898
October
15, 1901
February 1,
1904

4% 1896
4% 1898
4% 1901
3% 190452
4% 1906

June 3,
1906

Amount in
BEF

Convertibility

Other Elements

422,200

No mention

As reimbursement for former member
of the Comité d’Etudes du Haut Congo

150,000,000

No mention

Lottery

Not convertible for ten
years after the issue
Not convertible for ten
years after the issue
Not convertible before
1922
Not convertible for ten
years after the issue
Exchangeable for a 3%
Belgian loan in case of
annexation (option
valid for five years)

Issued to cover extraordinary expenses
linked to public works in the CFS
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses
linked to public works in the Congo
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses
linked to public works in the Congo
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses
linked to public works in the Congo

1,500,000
12,500,000
50,000,000
30,000,000
10,000,000

Linked to railway construction.
Advance for an authorized issue to take
place later

49. See Nicolas Degive & Kim Oosterlinck, Independence and the Effect of Empire: The Case of
“Sovereign Debts” Issued by British Colonies, 38 (Ctr. Emile Bernheim, Working Paper No. 19-018,
2019), https://ideas.repec.org/p/sol/wpaper/2013-294694.html [https://perma.cc/FRC2-LAGZ].
50. See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 4, at 1220.
51. See generally Situation Financière et Budget Colonial, in No. 590, Ministère des Finances, Oud
fonds, Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels, Belgium (MIFINOUD); see also Fonds
d’Amortissement de l’emprunt à lot de l’E.I. [hereinafter Fonds d’Amortissement], in No. 590,
MIFINOUD; CONGO BELGE: RECUEIL ADMINISTRATIF DES FINANCES FASC. II app. at 29–32 (1912),
in No. 592, MIFINOUD.
52. This bond as well as the 1901 bond only met limited success. An internal memo from the Belgian
Ministry of Finance states that only half of the 3% loan had actually been issued and a notable part of
the 4% loan was still available for sale. See Emprunts Décrétés par l’Etat Indépendant depuis 1901, in No.
589, MIFINOUD.
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4% Treasury
Bills

Decree
NA

Amount in
BEF
2,040,000
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Convertibility

Other Elements

No mention

Advance for an authorized issue to take
place later

Some of the bonds listed in Table 1 had unusual features, making them
difficult to use for our purposes: the lottery feature of the lottery bond of 1888,
the limited liquidity of the partially issued bond of 1901, and the short maturity
of the Treasury Bills of 1908. We exclude these three bonds from our analysis for
these reasons.53
The 1888 lottery loan was particularly complex. The archives for the Belgian
Minister of Finance show numerous attempts to assess the YTM of this bond.54
Part of the complication was that the market did not take up all of the bond issue
at issuance, thereby changing the originally estimated likelihood of a lottery
win—a factor that then influenced the real YTM of the bond (only 916,875 out
of 1,500,000 bonds were successfully marketed).55 To make things more complex,
the CFS then passed a decree to convert the lottery bond into a 3% perpetuity in
September 1903.56 But that attempt created controversy and was eventually
abandoned.57 All of these events complicate an estimation of the YTM.
Like the 1888 lottery bond, the 1901 issue also met limited success. Belgian
stockbroker Oscar Crabbe’s testimony in the trial relating to Leopold’s
succession suggests that less than half of the bond was initially floated, with bonds
subsequently being sold up until 1906.58 Again, the lack of accurate information
regarding how much of the bond was issued and when complicates an accurate
estimation of its YTM since the bond was likely to be illiquid.
Finally, twelve million francs worth of Treasury Bills were issued in 1908,
when Leopold was forced to give up control of the CFS to Belgium.59 We put
these aside because it is not clear how involved the Belgian government was in
these final issuances and, more importantly, whether the market perceived it to
be involved. It seems plausible that investors perceived Belgian government
involvement since Leopold had essentially been ejected by this point in time and
the Belgian Finance Ministry was taking over. For example, we know from a
53. In addition to the loans in Table 1, the CFS also guaranteed a 25-million-franc loan issued by La
Compagnie des Chemins de Fer des Grands Lacs, a railway company. See id.
54. See generally No. 587, MIFINOUD. Associating a lottery to a loan was disputed by some on
moral grounds. The Antwerp stock exchange refused to list this lottery bond, because foreign lottery
bonds were not allowed on their exchange. Despite pressures from the government, the bond was never
listed in Antwerp. Emprunt du Congo, LE SOIR, Mar. 19, 1888.
55. Fonds d’ Amortissement, supra note 51.
56. La conversion des lots du Congo, JOURNAL DES FINANCES (Fr), Oct. 3, 1903, at 4.
57. See, e.g., Conversion des lots du Congo (Oct. 06, 1903), in No. 587, MIFINOUD; Conversion de
l’emprunt à lots du Congo (Oct. 14, 1903), in No. 587, MIFINOUD. The pressure to abandon the plan
came from the French and Belgian governments. La Conversion des Lots du Congo, JOURNAL DES
FINANCES (Fr.), Jan. 30, 1904, at 8.
58. Princess Louise of Belgium v. The Belgian State, Cour d’appel [CA] [Court of Appeal]
Bruxelles, Apr. 2, 1913, Plaidoirie de Me Eugène Hanssens at 136–37.
59. See Note, in No. 591, MIFINOUD.
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handwritten document from the Belgian Ministry of Finance that the Société
Générale de Belgique, the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles, and the Banque
de Paris et des Pays-Bas were involved in these issues.60
In addition to the foregoing complications, a full set of pricing data for the
1901 loan and the Treasury Bills was not available.
IV
ANALYSIS
With this data in hand, we return to our two primary questions. First, we ask
whether the markets, once news of Leopold’s despotism became widespread,
began to impose a sin penalty on his borrowing. Second, we ask whether Belgium
received a market reward for paying Leopold’s odious debts in full instead of
trying to repudiate them.
For each of the CFS bonds included in our dataset, we collected weekly prices
from the Courrier de la Bourse et de la Banque. 61 The Courrier de la Bourse et de
la Banque treated the 1896 and 1898 issuances as being the same and gave them
a single price since they had similar characteristics. Therefore, we also treat them
as being a single issue. Our sample ranges from January 1900 to December 1910.
We picked this time range because it covers the period where we can be confident
that the markets knew about Leopold’s atrocities (around 1903), and goes until
his removal (1907–08). To be safe, we add in a couple of years of data before and
after. In general, the prices for all bonds move from week to week, suggesting
that there was regular trading. To set these prices into perspective we also
collected prices for the 4% 1909 bond issued by the Belgian Congo (that is after
the supposedly virtuous takeover by Belgium) and prices for a representative
Belgian bond.62
To compare bonds with different maturities and different coupons we
compute the YTM of the various bonds. The 1896, 1898, and 1906 loans were
perpetuities. The 1901 and 1909 loans did not have a specific maturity but a
sinking fund was created to buy them back on the market, and eventually
extinguish the debt after 99 and 90 years respectively. We treat these bonds as if
they had these maturities under the assumption that bondholders whose bonds

60. Sources available from authors.
61. The prices of all loans discussed in this Article were published weekly on Friday (and in case of
public holiday, the earliest date before). Pricing data for the CFS 1896 4% and Belgian 3% loans derive
from research conducted by Sydartha Mikaba Kibingua. See Sydartha Mikaba Kibingua, The Debt of the
Etat Indépendant du Congo (2012) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, SBS-EM, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
(on file with authors). Pricing data for all other loans derive from a physical review of the weekly issues
of Courrier de la Banque et de la Bourse for the years 1900–10. These issues are available at the
Bibliotheque Royal de Belgique [Royal Library of Belgium]. All data are on file with Law &
Contemporary Problems.
62. Decree of the 30 January 1909, amount issued 6,800,000 BEF, coupon 4%, non-convertible
before 1920, to be amortized in 90 years.
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had been recalled would use the proceeds of the sale to buy back a similar bond
in order to maintain the same general portfolio balance.63
A. Did the Markets Distinguish Between the Earlier and Later Bonds?
Our first question regarding the CFS debt is whether, as news of Leopold’s
horrors in the CFS became public, the market began to impose a penalty on his
borrowing—as researchers report happened with regard to sin stocks or, in the
sovereign context, with certain Spanish debts in the late 1890s, the Tsarist Bond
in 1906, and Venezuela’s recent Hunger Bond.64
Leopold’s borrowing is particularly useful for asking the foregoing question
since his CFS bond issuances can be put into two distinctive categories: (1) the
debt issued in his early years, roughly, 1885–1901, when many viewed him as a
benevolent leader, and (2) the debt issued after 1903 and until his forced removal
in 1908, by which time the world had learned of the horrors of his rule and that
his primary motive was personal economic gain.
To the extent the markets imposed a penalty on sin—particularly on the
bonds supported by lenders who were aware (or should have been aware) of the
sin they were financing—we should see a higher market penalty imposed on the
bonds issued after 1903.
Below, in Figure 1, we show the YTM patterns for four CFS bonds; in relative
terms, two virtuous (the pre-1903 issuances) and two sinful (the post-1903
issuances). The dark vertical line at the end of October 1908 represents the date
after which assumption of the CFS debts by the Belgian government became
more certain. The results are remarkable in light of the very different results
found in Collet (2013), Collet & Oosterlinck (2018) and Gulati & Panizza (2019),
where the market penalized the sinful bonds.65 For the CFS, despite the fact that
the sin in question was at least as large, if not many times worse, than in the
aforementioned cases, there appears to have been no penalty imposed.

63. This is as in Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31.
64. See supra Part II.
65. Collet, supra note 32; Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31; Gulati & Panizza, supra note 29.
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Figure 1. YTM of CFS Bonds66
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All four of the YTMs are very close, with the 1904 3% loan slightly lower than
the others, despite this being one of the sinful bonds. Table 2, which provides
descriptive statistics for the YTMs of the various bonds, confirms this impression.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the YTMs of the CFS Bonds67
Period
Minimum
Maximum
Median
Mean

1896–98
4% loan
1900–10
3.96%
4.50%
4.18%
4.18%

1901 4% loan

1904 3% loan

1906 4% loan

September 1901–10
3.91%
4.54%
4.13%
4.15%

April 1904–10
3.59%
4.42%
3.93%
3.96%

September 1907–10
4.03%
4.51%
4.14%
4.24%

Since the bonds were issued at different points in time, the number of
observations and the period covered differ across bonds. Despite this, the
descriptive statistics show a similar pattern for all the CFS bonds with YTMs
ranging from 3.59% to 4.54%. Basically, over a period of ten years, we see the
market treating all these bonds in essentially the same fashion. Therefore, the
data show that the attacks made against Leopold’s horrors in the CFS by the
international press had at best a marginal impact on the bonds’ YTMs. There is

66. The YTM data discussed in this Article derive from the authors’ calculations, relying upon the
collected prices and expiries of each bond at the relevant date. See supra notes 19, 51, 61 and
accompanying text. All data are on file with Law & Contemporary Problems.
67. Id.
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no break around 1904 when the press campaigns against Leopold’s rule were
prominent. This is opposite the expected outcome based on the results found by
Collet and Oosterlinck for the 1906 Tsarist Bond and Panizza and Gulati for the
Venezuelan Hunger Bond.68 In both those episodes, the authors ascribe an
important role to the press in conveying the odious character of the bond, leading
to a market penalty.
As noted earlier, our starting point in expecting the market to apply a price
discount to the more odious or sinful bonds was two prior episodes at the end of
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The two historical
episodes had to do with movement in the YTM of Spanish debt backed by Cuban
revenues following the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the YTM of the 1906
Tsarist Bond.
The YTMs we see in Figure 1 and Table 2 stand in contrast with the results
for the Tsarist Bond, which was denounced as odious by the French press and
traded at some points in time at a YTM above 7%. This contrast is even stronger
with the Cuban 5% loan which traded at a YTM of close to 20% during the
negotiations following the Spanish-American War.69 This YTM reflected, in part,
the costs of the war. But Collet shows that this bond, singled out as being odious,
traded at close to 500 basis points more than another Cuban debt not viewed as
odious.70 The YTM patterns for the CFS and Belgian debts thus confirm that
market participants were not treating the sinful and virtuous debts differentially.
Moreover, several bonds had conversion options: the state had the right to
call back the bonds and ask bondholders either to accept a bond with a lower
coupon or accept reimbursement.71 Conversion options are similar to call options.
Bond prices reflect the expected revenues derived from holding the bond minus
the value of the call option.72 Conversion options thus affect the YTM.73 In fact,
by not taking this conversion option into account we overestimate the YTM. In
other words, real YTMs are even smaller than the ones presented in Table 1, and
the market imposed an even lower penalty than our data would suggest.74
68.
69.
70.
71.

Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31; Gulati & Panizza, supra note 29.
Collet, supra note 32; Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31.
Collet, supra note 32.
HENRI LABEYRIE, THÉORIE ET HISTOIRE DES CONVERSIONS DE RENTES SUIVIE D’UNE
ÉTUDE SUR LA CONVERSION DU 5% FRANÇAIS (1878).
72. In theory it is possible to compute the value of the option and to then compute the YTM. This
requires making assumptions on the term structure of interest rates for which prices Congolese bonds
without conversion option are needed. Unfortunately, these data do not exist.
73. Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31; Kim Oosterlinck, Loredana Ureche-Rangau & JacqueMarie Vaslin, Aristocratic Privilege. Exploiting “Good” Institutions (Ctr. Econ. Policy Research, Working
Paper No. DP14071, 2019), https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14071
[https://perma.cc/9H2C-XX5R].
74. The overestimation suggests an even lower market penalty on the CFS bonds than the one
reported previously. The overestimation is nonetheless likely to be small. Indeed, all bonds were
protected from conversion for a period of time and during our sample period only two bonds (the 1896
and 1898 loans) could be converted. See supra Table 1. Yet, their YTMs are very close to the YTMs of
the other 4% loans in our sample suggesting the market attached little value to the option. Further, for
the conversion option to be valuable, prices of the bond have at least to reach par. Otherwise, the state
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A different way of getting at the question of whether the markets
distinguished between the sinful and more virtuous Congo bonds is to examine
the relative YTMs of the CFS bonds and those of the Belgian Congo.
Figure 2 compares the YTM from July 1909 (when the Belgian Congo bond
was first listed) to December 31, 1910. As in Figure 1, the YTMs of the 1904 CFS
3% bonds are slightly below the others (suggesting that the market liked the
especially sinful bonds even more than the others). But, generally, the YTM of
the Belgian Congo 1909 bond is indistinguishable from the CFS bonds. This view
from Figure 2 is confirmed by the descriptive statistics in Table 3.
Figure 2. YTMs of the CFS and Belgian Congo Bonds75
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the YTMs of the CFS and Belgian Congo Bonds76
CFS
Minimum
Maximum
Median
Mean

1896–98 4% loan
3.96%
4.15%
4.06%
4.06%

4% 1901
3.91%
4.04%
3.98%
3.98%

3% 1904
3.61%
3.96%
3.79%
3.78%

4% 1906
4.03%
4.14%
4.09%
4.09%

Belgian Congo
4% 1909
3.90%
4.05%
3.97%
3.97%

In sum, it does not appear that the market in the two years after the
annexation of the CFS by Belgium treated its bonds any differently than those of
has no interest in calling the bonds since its current borrowing terms are less advantageous than the
prevailing term for a given bond. Prices were indeed close to (and even sometimes above) par for the 4%
bonds but not for the 3% one. With prices never exceeding 85% of par during our sample period, the 3%
loan was unlikely to be converted. The YTMs on the 3% loan are slightly smaller than the ones observed
on the other loans. This is consistent with a lower likelihood of conversion. The YTMs computed on the
3% loan are thus the least affected by the conversion option and will therefore be used as our favorite
reference afterwards.
75. See supra note 66.
76. Id.

FINAL - OOSTERLINCK (DO NOT DELETE)

64

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

6/26/2020 3:56 PM

[Vol. 83:49

Belgian Congo. The Leopoldian colony and the Belgian colony were viewed by
investors as essentially the same in terms of moral taint or repudiation risk. And
this did not necessarily have to be the case, since other researchers have shown
that the markets of that period were quite capable of distinguishing bonds based
on their origin.77
B. Did Belgium Receive a Reward for Paying Leopold’s Bonds?
To examine whether Belgium received a market reward or penalty for
choosing to pay the bonds of the CFS in 1908 and thereafter, we first compare
the YTMs of the bonds of Belgium and the CFS before and after 1908 and then
examine the spreads between those bonds before and after 1908 in Figures 3 and
4, respectively. In particular, we are interested in the impact on the YTMs of
Belgian sovereign bonds after the decision to pay these CFS bonds in 1907–08.
Drawing from pricing data collected by Mikaba Kibingua,78 we report below
on a comparison of the YTMs of the CFS 1896–98 loan with the Belgian 3% loan
on a period ranging from 1899 to 1913. Kibingua finds that the spread between
the two loans was relatively small.79 As mentioned previously, the 1896–98 loan
was more likely to be called than the 3% 1904 issuance. The 1904 loan series,
however, begins later in our sample. We therefore report the YTMs for the 4%
1896–98 CFS loan, the 3% 1904 loan, and the 3% Belgian loan for the 1900–10
period in Figure 3.

77. Stephanie Collet, A Unified Italy: Sovereign Debt and Investor Skepticism 30–31 (Aug, 1, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? [https:// perma.cc/6MJE-2NUD].
78. See Mikaba Kibingua, supra note 61.
79. See generally id. Her analysis reports semi-annual yield to maturity. Based on the raw data we
computed the yearly YTM.
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Figure 3. Belgian and CFS Bond YTMs80
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As we would expect, the YTMs on the bonds of the European colonizing
power, Belgium, are lower than those of the CFS. What we are interested in,
though, is whether Belgium, because of its decision to take on payment of the
CFS bonds in 1908, was rewarded by the market for its “good debtor” behavior—
paying debts it arguably could have avoided—with a lowering of YTMs on its
borrowing. Based on reports in the primary financial news outlet at the time, we
estimate the rough date on which the market would have had confidence that
Belgium was taking over the CFS debts as somewhere around the last week of
October 1908.81 If the end of October 1908 is taken as reference point, the
evolution of the Belgian bond YTMs does not show any form of reward. Indeed,
the YTMs experienced a slightly increasing trend with an average YTM of 3.15%
for the period ranging from the end of October 1906 to the end of October 1908,
and 3.20% from the end of October 1908 to the end of October 1910. Increasing
the size of the window shows an even more dramatic increase with Belgian YTMs
reaching a value close to 4% in December 1912.

80. See supra note 66.
81. The report in the Journal des Finances reads:
The law of annexation of Congo to Belgium, whose text has just been published in the Belgian
Official Journal, draws attention of the market for these securities. Although the law has
specified that the debts of the colony and the metropolis will remain separate, it is clear that
Belgium is becoming morally responsible for servicing the Congolese debt, in the same way that
the French state is morally responsible for the debts of his colonies. However, we know the firstclass security of Belgian finances. It is therefore ensured on the stock market that the prices of
the Congo Lots, which, in recent days, are already showing signs of effervescence, are to quickly
exceed the price of 100 francs.
Notes & Arbitrages, JOURNAL DES FINANCES, Oct. 24, 1908, at 1011 (translation by authors).
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The CFS bonds, as one might expect, do go down in YTM when the Belgian
state takes over the responsibility for paying them; news reports demonstrate that
there was some uncertainty over whether the Belgian state would take on this
responsibility.82 The transformation of the CFS into a colony was perceived by
market participants as a sign that Belgium would from then on guarantee the CFS
debt, and as a result bonds were treated as other colonial bonds were. Figures 4
and 5 show us what happened. Belgium’s YTMs in the 1907–08 period do not fall,
either when viewed on their own or in comparison to the CFS bonds. Instead,
there is a rise in the YTMs. This rise in YTMs may reflect several fears, one of
which being that Belgium implicitly recognized responsibility for a large debt not
backed by enough resources. The bottom line: There is no indication that
Belgium received a YTM benefit for taking on the responsibility for paying
Leopold’s debts. The ones who did benefit were those creditors who had lent
Leopold the funds that supported his CFS misadventure.
Figure 4 provides the spread in the YTMs between the CFS bonds and the
Belgian bond. This measure allows us to better assess the dynamics of the
difference in the YTMs.
Figure 4. Spreads for CFS Bonds83
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Spread 1896–98
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The spread peaks in 1906 for both loans. It remains generally relatively low.
This is confirmed by the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.

82. See Congo Deficit Likely: Belgium Bound Morally to Stand Sponsor, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
1908, at 3.
83. See supra note 66.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of the YTMs of the CFS Bonds, the Belgian Bond, and
their Spreads84
CFS
Period
Minimum
Maximum
Median
Mean

1896–98
4% loan
1900–10
3.96%
4.15%
4.06%
4.06%

Belgium

1904 3% loan

3% loan

April 1904–10
3.59%
4.42%
3.93%
3.96%

1900–10
3.03%
3.34%
3.09%
3.13%

Spread
CFS 1896–98 4%
CFS 1904 3% loan –
loan – Belgium 3%
Belgium 3%
1900–10
April 1904–10
0.73%
0.39%
1.45%
1.38%
1.06%
0.84%
1.06%
0.82%

For the whole period, and relying on the overestimated YTM of the 1896–98
loan, the spread ranges from 73 to 145 basis points with an average of 106 basis
points.85 When comparing the 1904 CFS bond and the Belgian bond YTMs, the
spread averages only 84 basis points. In both cases the spread declines following
the annexation, with the lowest values recorded after the annexation.
As a final comparison, we look at the spreads of a number of British colonies,
to compare them to those of the CFS and Belgian Congo.86 Figure 5 provides the
spread with respect to the British consol for Canada, Cape Colony, Ceylon,
Egypt, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Natal, New South-Wales, New Zealand,
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia.
Figure 5. Spreads for British Colony Bonds87
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84. Id.
85. By 1910 (the end of our dataset) the 1896–98 could be converted, whereas the 1904 loans still
had a protection from conversion. The overestimation of the YTM for this bond comes from the fact that
the value of the conversion option for the bond cannot be accurately estimated. See supra text
accompanying note 72.
86. The data on YTM spreads between England and her colonies derive from the research by
Accominotti et al., supra note 46.
87. Id.
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What the foregoing tells us is that the figures we discussed earlier for the CFS
were the norm. Over the whole period the spreads for the British colonies are
smaller than the CFS ones. However, once annexed to Belgium, the spreads
become closer, in line with British colonies. If the market penalized the CFS
bonds, or rewarded Belgium’s guarantee of those CFS bonds, then the spread
between the CFS and Belgian bonds would have remained greater than the
spreads of the colonial bonds in Figure 5.
In other words, Belgium did not receive a market reward for paying for
Leopold’s sins. The bondholders who funded Leopold did, though. And that
raises the question of why Belgium paid off the debts; we return to that puzzle in
the conclusion.
V
CONCLUSION: WHY DIDN’T THE DOG BARK?
From the data analyzed above, nothing suggests that the markets imposed
any penalty on King Leopold’s borrowing, even though there was widespread
international outrage against his behavior (including within Belgium itself).
Indeed, the outrage was such that he was forced to give up power. Belgium then
accepted responsibility for the CFS bonds and paid them, despite the fact that the
usual explanation for why successor states pay the debts of prior despots—
reputation—does not seem to hold here.
So, why didn’t the Holmesian dog bark?88 After all, we know from other
research that markets do often impose a sin penalty on financial securities
associated with bad behavior.89 There are three potential reasons, all of which
will require further research to assess.
A. Self-Interest on the Part of Belgian Officials
Our first conjecture has to do with possible financial self-interest on the part
of powerful actors in Belgium. This explanation was raised in 1908 by members
of the Parti Ouvrier Belge [Belgian Labor Party], when the socialist politician,
Jules Destrée, accused the members of the right-wing parties of acting in selfinterest to paper over Leopold’s odious debts because to have called them into
question would have also called into question their own substantial investments
in the Congo.90
The Belgian socialist newspaper, Le Peuple, went as far as to publish a list of
legislators involved in these investments. According to the socialist leader, the

88. Sherlock Holmes’ creator, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, was famously a key part of the humanitarian
campaign against Leopold, along with Mark Twain and Joseph Conrad. See, e.g. ARTHUR CONAN
DOYLE, THE CRIME OF THE CONGO (1909); Blocher & Gulati, supra note 4, at 1238 n.115.
89. See supra Part II.
90. See generally Séance du Venrendi 18 Juin 1908, 8 Annales Parlementaires de la Chambre des
Représentants 47–60 (statements of M. Destrée).
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state taking over the debts of the CFS was a way of legitimizing the problematic
concessions made to the private firms that many powerful Belgians were
benefiting from.91
B. No Press Focus on Bad Bonds
In both the stories about the 1906 Tsarist Bond and the Venezuelan Hunger
Bond, the international press focused on and discussed the problematic
provenance of the bonds in question (for example, that they were issued without
appropriate legislative approval or severely underpriced).92 In our examination
of the historical record, we found no articles casting doubt on the validity of any
of Leopold’s debt issuances at the time they were made. Maybe, for the market
to impose a penalty on a sin bond, there needs to be a precursor in the form of
negative press attention that then catches fire.
C. Belgium’s Own Culpability for Leopold’s Sins
The final possibility has to do with Belgium’s own culpability regarding the
exactions made in the Congo. The question of Belgium’s culpability for Leopold’s
excesses is a much debated one. Leopold, after all, was the king of the Belgians
all through the period of his rule of the CFS. And while it is clear that there was
reluctance on the part of the Belgian government to become a colonial power,
Belgium was one of Leopold’s biggest creditors all through his reign. Indeed, but
for Belgium providing crucial financial support at key moments, Leopold’s reign
in the Congo would have likely ended long before it actually did.
Further, Leopold used his ill-gotten gains to build grand palaces and fancy
gardens in Belgium.93 So, maybe the markets neither penalized the tainted CFS
bonds, nor subsequently rewarded Belgium for taking them on, because of a
collective market judgment that a significant enough portion of the moral taint
lay with Belgium itself. Belgium, in essence, had primary moral responsibility for
constraining Leopold (at least as compared to general bondholders) and it, more
than anyone else, reaped the rewards of Leopold’s bad behavior.
We have seen from the prior research described in Part II that markets can
and do sometimes impose penalties on immoral behavior. But perhaps what we
are seeing here is that there are limits to crowdsourced disapproval; that it is a lot
less effective in penalizing bad behavior when judgements about comparative
fault are at issue.94 And that then leads to the question of whether there is a need
91. Id. at 31 (“The interest of the concessionary companies in Belgium taking over the succession
of the Congo Free State is not debatable . . . . If Belgium assumes, as regular and valid, the obligations of
the Congo Free State, the interests of the companies are fully insured.”).
92. See Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31, at 218; Panizza & Gulati, supra note 27, at 28.
93. Jean Stengers, King Leopold’s Imperialism, in STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM 248,
261 (Roger Owen & Bob Sutcliffe eds., 1972) (noting that Leopold “did make money out of the Congo,
but he used it almost exclusively to enrich the Belgian national heritage by acquiring property, building
monuments and developing towns”).
94. As of this writing, there has been little consideration in the odious debt literature of situations
where judgements about comparative fault need to be made. See generally Mitu Gulati & Omri Ben-
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for formal legal sanctions, and how that sanctioning mechanism may best be
designed.

Shahar, Partially Odious Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2007, at 47, for a conversation on
the potential allocation of odious debt costs among parties after a despot has been dethroned.

